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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCIAL SPEECH-FACE-TO-FACE
SOLICITATION BY CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (BUT NOT
ATTORNEYS?) IS PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT.
I. INTRODUCTION
Edenfield v. Fane' marks a recent Supreme Court attempt to
define the evolving commercial speech doctrine. In Edenfield, the
Court found a Florida law prohibiting face-to-face solicitation by
certified public accountants violative of the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment by applying the commercial speech test from
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.2
The Court reasoned that the Florida law failed the third prong of
the Central Hudson test-the law did not directly advance the state's
asserted interest.
3
This note will retrace the facts and procedural history of the
Edenfield decision, briefly describe the development of commercial
speech as a constitutional doctrine, and analyze the reasoning of
the Supreme Court decision. Particular emphasis will be placed on
solicitation and its treatment within the commercial speech doctrine.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 4 the landmark solicitation case
prior to Edenfield, will be examined in detail. Finally, the effect of
the judicial treatment of solicitation will be examined for its potential
impact not only on certified public accountants, but other professions
as well, most notably the profession of law.5
1. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (19931.
2. Id. at 1798. The four-pronged Central Hudson test asks these questions of
a regulation restricting commercial speech: (1) is the speech misleading or does it
concern unlawful activity; (2) is the asserted governmental interest substantial; (3)
does the regulation directly and materially advance the state interest; and (4) is
the regulation more extensive than necessary to serve the interest? The first and
second prongs must be answered affirmatively before applying prongs three and
four. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
3. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993).
4. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
5. The juxtaposition of the Edenfield and Ohralik holdings suggests a hypo-
thetical in which an accountant and an attorney have a chance meeting. If, during
their encounter, the CPA offers his accounting services to the attorney, the Edenfield
holding seems to clearly protect this form of speech. If, on the other hand, the
attorney makes an unsolicited offer of his legal services to the accountant, neither
Edenfield nor Ohralik appears to protect the attorney's speech. In fact, such an
offer from the attorney appears to fall squarely within the prohibited conduct of
Rule 7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. ARKANSAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
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II. FACTS
Scott Fane is a certified public accountant (CPA) who moved
from New Jersey to Florida in 1985.6 He was certified as a CPA
in both states. 7 While practicing in New Jersey, Fane specialized in
tax services to small and medium-sized businesses. He often sought
new business by making permitted, unsolicited telephone calls to
potential clients.8
After moving to Florida, however, Fane found that such so-
licitation was prohibited by Florida law. 9 The law, a rule promulgated
by the Florida Board of Accountancy, specifically forbade both
uninvited visits and telephone calls if the recipient was not already
a client and had not initiated the contact with the CPA. 0 Because
he was unable to seek business as he had done in New Jersey, Fane
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Florida seeking declaratory and injunctive relief."
Fane argued that the Board of Accountancy's anti-solicitation
rule violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 He asserted
that his ability to offer services at prices lower than the prevailing
market was severely restrained. 3 He also claimed that existing re-
lationships between accountants and clients were seldom, if ever,
CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) (1990). Rule 7.3 of the Arkansas Rules was adopted without
revision from the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) (1991) (The Arkansas Rules were taken from
the 1983 version of the Model Rules. The Model Rules were amended in 1991.).
Arkansas Rule 7.3(a) states in pertinent part, "A lawyer shall not by in-person or
live telephone contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a
significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain." AR-
KANSAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) (1990).
6. 113 S. Ct. at 1796.7. Fane v. 114l, 945 ,.,d 514, 1516 kEleventh Cir. A'11. Tue Eleventh
Circuit decision, also decided in favor of Fane, was a 2-1 decision. Id. at 1514.
8. 113 S. Ct. at 1796.
9. FLA. ADmiN. CODE ANN. r. 21A-24.002(2)-(3) (1992). The code states in
relevant part that a licensed accountant "shall not by any direct, in-person, uninvited
solicitation solicit an engagement to perform public accounting services .... Un-
invited in-person visits or conversations or telephone calls to a specific potential
client are prohibited." Id.
10. Id. at r. 21A-24.002(2).
11. 113 S. Ct. at 1797.
12. Id. The Supreme Court opinion discusses only the First Amendment free
speech argument; thus, this note will be similarly limited to that issue only. The
Board of Accountancy did make an argument based on a time, place, and manner
restriction, but the Court summarily dismissed the argument. See infra text ac-
companying notes 121-22.
13. 113 S. Ct. at 1797 (citing Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs 9-11 (App. 3-
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severed, especially if other accountants were denied the opportunity
to initiate business discussions.' 4 Thus, under Florida rule, an ac-
countant like Fane would find it particularly difficult to attract new
clients or start business in a new area. 5 It should be noted that
Fane never actually violated the Florida anti-solicitation rule; instead,
he sued prospectively, alleging that but for the rule he would solicit
clients in Florida as he had in New Jersey.
16
The Board of Accountancy argued that the rule served the dual
purpose of: (1) "protecting consumers from fraud or overreaching"
and (2) maintaining the independence of CPAs to perform correctly
their audit and attest functions.' 7 The Board hoped to extend the
Court's reasoning from the Ohralik case where a similar prophylactic
rule against attorney solicitation was permitted to stand. 8
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fane.' 9
The anti-solicitation rule was enjoined to the extent that it applied
to CPAs who engage in "in-person, direct, uninvited solicitation in
the business context." 20 A panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a 2-1 decision. 2' The
Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, also affirmed. 22 Writing for the
Court, Justice Kennedy distinguished not only the Ohralik holding,
but also the practice of law. 23 The Court held that a prophylactic
anti-solicitation rule might be appropriate to prevent overreaching
by attorneys, but the Florida rule for accountants does not satisfy
First Amendment requirements.2 In particular, the Court found that
14. 113 S. Ct. at 1796 (citing Plaintiff's Affidavit, paragraphs 7 and 11 (App.
11, 15)).
15. 113 S. Ct. at 1796.
16. Id. (citing Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs 9-11 (App. 3-4)).
17. 113 S. Ct. at 1799. The Court agreed with the Board that consumer protection
and CPA independence were indeed "substantial" state interests for purposes of
constitutional analysis. Id.
18. 113 S. Ct. at 1802; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 468 (1978). For a more detailed discussion of Ohralik, see infra text accom-
panying notes 82-101.
19. 113 S. Ct. at 1797.
20. Id. (citing the district court case Civ. Case No. 88-40264-MNP (N.D. Fla.,
Sept. 13, 1990)).
21. 945 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1991).
22. 113 S. Ct. at 1796. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion while Justice
O'Connor filed the lone dissent. Id. at 1804.
23. Id. at 1802-03. Justice Kennedy wrote, "The solicitation here poses none
of the same dangers [as in Ohralik]. Unlike a lawyer, a CPA is not 'a professional
trained in the art of persuasion.' " Id. at 1802 (quoting 436 U.S. at 465); see also
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 773 n.25 (1976) (drawing distinctions between different types of professions
and their constitutional treatment).
24. 113 S. Ct. at 1802.
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the Florida Board of Accountancy offered no evidence whatsoever
to show that the rule advanced the asserted state interests in any
direct and material way.
25
III. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Commercial Speech Jurisprudence
Despite the constitutional precept that "Congress shall make no
law . . .abridging the freedom of speech .... -26 speech uttered in
the commercial context has always drawn somewhat different
constitutional treatment than other forms of speech. 27 As a
constitutional doctrine, the concept of commercial speech is a relatively
recent judicial creation. The doctrine can be traced from Valentine
v. Chrestensen,28 a 1942 case regarding handbill distribution in New
York City, to its current status embodied in the four-part test from
the Central Hudson29 case of 1980. Its development has, at times,
been uneven, but most commentators today recognize at least four
landmark decisions that mark the development of commercial speech. 30
Scholars note Valentine v. Chrestensen31 because of what it
failed to do rather than what it did for commercial speech. The
Valentine Court created what has come to be known as the
"commercial speech exception" to the First Amendment right of
free speech when it refused to enjoin enforcement of a New York
City code prohibiting the distribution of handbills that contained
both commercial and political information. 2 The Court pointed out
25. Id. at 1800. The Court was very specific in pointing out that the Board
had failed to come up with any studies, anecdotal evidence, or even conduct of
Fane himself that might have supported the suggestion that a prophylactic anti-
solicitation rule would deter the unscrupulous CPA. Id. at 1800-01; cf. 436 U.S.
at 463 (pointing to attorney Ohralik's unsavory conduct as the focus of the case).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. EDWIN P. ROME & WEL1 H. ROBERTS, COR'ORATE AND COMMERCIAL
FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION IN BUSINESS 4 (1985);
see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1978).
28. 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see also ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 27.
29. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see the Central Hudson test appearing supra note 2.
30. ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 27; see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner,
Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. Rv. 627 (1992) (tracing the
commercial speech legacy); see also Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Commercial Speech after
Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66
TUL. L. REv. 1931, 1931-37 (1992) (including history of the commercial speech
doctrine as well as a discussion of recent changes in the Central Hudson test in
the wake of the Posadas and Fox cases).
31. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
32. Id. at 54-55; see also ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 4.
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that, although political speech must not be stifled by governmental
interference, commercial speech must give way to overriding public
needs when legislatures think it appropriate." In other words,
commercial speech was excepted from First Amendment safeguards.
Valentine gave commercial speech some constitutional recognition,
but failed to extend it any constitutional protection.1
4
The Court's attitude toward commercial speech remained
unchanged for the next thirty years. Finally in 1973, in Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations," the
Court showed subtle movement away from the commercial speech
exception and toward a more recognizable commercial speech
doctrine.16 Subsequently, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,37 the Court left little doubt that
some commercial speech invoked the protection of the First
Amendment.3" The Supreme Court struck down a Virginia law that
prohibited pharmacists from advertising drug prices by noting a poor
nexus between the rule and the state's interest in maintaining the
professionalism of licensed pharmacists.3 9 In addition, the holding
in the Virginia Pharmacy case states that it might be necessary to
analyze various professions differently for constitutional purposes 4
0
The free speech rights of one who wishes to speak about business
must now be weighed against the interests of the state in regulating
the speech. 4 ' Thus, the commercial speech doctrine was born. 42
The fourth and perhaps most pivotal case in the constitutional
development of commercial speech is Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission.43 The four-part test of the
33. 316 U.S. at 54.
34. RomE & ROBERTS, supra note 27; see generally Rowan v. Postmaster, 397
U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding the constitutionality of "stop-mail" procedure); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding law forbidding burning of draft
cards); Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974) (upholding
law prohibiting "for sale" signs because they cause white flight).
35. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
36. 413 U.S. at 391. The Court held that although a newspaper's want ads
segregated by gender are commercial speech and thus not entitled to First Amendment
protection, in another context such commercial speech might command some pro-
tection. Mauro, supra note 30, at 1935.
37. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
38. Id. at 770.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 755-56.
41. Id. at 770.
42. See RoME & ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 4; see also Mauro, supra note 30,
at 1931-37. If Virginia Pharmacy was not clearly the birth of the commercial speech
doctrine, it was at least the unmistakeable death of the commercial speech exception.
43. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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Central Hudson case has become the centerpiece of commercial
speech analysis. 4 The facts of Central Hudson parallel many
commercial speech cases. Central Hudson involved a law that
proscribed advertising by an electric utility.45 The New York electric
company challenged the complete ban on advertising by a utility
and ultimately won." The anti-advertising law was struck down
because the state failed to show a clear connection between the law
and its asserted interest in maintaining an equitable rate structure
for electricity.
47
Central Hudson's legacy is the four-part test for commercial
speech application. The test, followed closely in Edenfield, asks four
questions before a regulation prohibiting some form of commercial
speech can be upheld: (1) is the speech misleading or does it concern
illegal activity; (2) is the state interest substantial; (3) does the
regulation directly advance the state interest; and (4) is the regulation
more extensive than necessary to serve the state interest?4
Justice Powell, the author of the Central Hudson decision,
anticipated that some might interpret the test as reflecting a content-
based suppression of free speech.4 9 To justify the Court's now-settled
position concerning First Amendment protection for commercial
speech, Powell offered two reasons. 0 First, commercial speakers
ought to be uniquely positioned to evaluate the truthfulness and
lawfulness of their speech." Second, "commercial speech, the offspring
of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression."15 2 Powell's
justification won acceptance, it seems, because no subsequent opinions
have successfully challenged the Central Hudson test as a suppression
of free speech based on content.
In the late 1980s, two cases appeared to reverse the trend leading
up to Central Hudson and hinted at a movement toward lesser
protection for commercial speech. In Posadas de Puerto Rico
44. Id. at 564.
45. Id. at 558-60.
46. Id. at 561.
47. Id. at 569.
48. Id. at 564.
49. Id. at 564 n.6.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. But not all commercial speech has proven quite so hardy under the
Central Hudson analysis. See Board of Trustees of State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469 (1989); Posados de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986);
Los Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Metro-
media, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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Associates v. Tourism Co.," the Supreme Court allowed the restriction
of casino advertising targeted only to native Puerto Ricans.54 If the
underlying activity (here, gambling) could be proscribed by the
legislature, the Court reasoned, so could the advertisement of such
activity." Then in 1989, in Board of Trustees of State University
v. Fox,56 when Justice Scalia undertook to modify the fourth prong
of the Central Hudson test, the result suggested a further diminution
of First Amendment protection for commercial speech.5 7 Scalia
replaced the Central Hudson least restrictive means test for commercial
speech analysis with a reasonable fit test giving more deference to
legislative bodies.58 The Court in Fox remanded on the issue of
whether a New York law could constitutionally prevent the sale of
Tupperware-type products at parties held in state university dorm
rooms. 9 Nevertheless, the message to the lower court was clear;
commercial speech need only be defined as speech which "proposes
a commercial transaction,' ' 6 and once the speech is so classified,
any law threatening it need only be subjected to a reasonable fit
analysis. 6' Scalia hastened to add that this new test was not reduced
to the level of rational scrutiny applied in Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection analysis. 62 Here, unlike rational scrutiny, the
government interest must be substantial, the cost must be carefully
calculated, and the government must justify its commercial speech
restrictions.
63
53. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
54. Id. at 336.
55. Id. at 345.
56. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
57. Id. at 480; see also Paul B. Blechner, First Amendment: Supreme Court
Rejection of the Least Restrictive Alternative Test, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 331
(1991) (comparing the post-Fox state of commercial speech jurisprudence to that
even before Virginia Pharmacy). Blechner attributes this First Amendment diminution
not only to the Fox holding but also to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781 (1989).
58. 492 U.S. at 480. Scalia wrote, "What our decisions require is a 'fit' between
the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends . . . a fit
that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest
served ... .' " Id.
59. Id. at 486.
60. Id. at 482.
61. Id. at 480.
62. Id. Traditional equal protection rational scrutiny involves only a reasonable
fit between means and ends. The standard is relatively low and is based on "practical
considerations." Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 108
(1949).
63. 492 U.S. at 480.
1994] 89
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The commercial speech pendulum, however, appears to have
swung back again in the early 1990s. In a foreshadowing of Edenfield
in 1993, Cincinnati v. Discovery Networkl shifted the balance of
commercial speech jurisprudence back toward the First Amendment. 6
In a narrow holding,6 the Court voted 6-3 to strike down a Cincinnati
city ordinance that purported to advance the safety and aesthetics
of the city streets by prohibiting newsracks that contained commercial
handbills.67 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens reasoned that
the ordinance lacked the necessary means-to-ends fit required by the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test as modified by Fox." A
distinction between commercial and non-commercial newsracks might
have meaning in another context, the Court said, but as a means
of enhancing street safety and beauty, it bore no relation whatsoever.6 9
B. Solicitation as a Form of Commercial Speech
Even before the emergence of commercial speech as a
constitutionally discrete form of communication, solicitation had
never fit easily into broad categories of accepted speech.70 Historically
within the legal profession, for example, solicitation of any kind
was considered inappropriate and distasteful. 7' In the English Inns
of Court, young lawyers generally came from well-to-do families,
therefore the practice of law was often not necessary for their
livelihoods.7 2 Not coincidentally, lawyers comprised a tight-knit
homogeneous group within which competition for clients was neither
cultivated nor required.73 Since many early American lawyers were
64. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
65. Id. at 1516-17.
66. Id. at 1516. "Our holding, however, is narrow," wrote Justice Stevens for
the Court. "Because the distinction t(incinnati has drawn has absolutely no bearing
on the interests it has asserted, we have no difficulty concluding, as did the two
courts below, that the city has not established the 'fit'. . . ." Id.
67. Id. at 1507. Cincinnati city ordinances sections 714-1-C and 714.23 define
handbills and prohibit their distribution on public property. Id. at 1508 nn.2-3.
68. 113 S. Ct. at 1516.
69. Id.
70. HARRY J. HAYNSWORTH, Marketing and Legal Ethics: The Rules and Risks,
1990 A.B.A. SEC. L. PRAC. MGMT. 42-45. Although advertising has made great
strides towards acceptance, even in the legal community, solicitation has yet to
escape its past. Drawing a precise line between permissible solicitation and other
means of advertising is the hard question for legislatures, law firms, and individual
attorneys. Id.
71. Louise L. Iill, A Lawyer's Pecuniary Gain: The Enigma of Impermissible
Solicitation, 5 GEo. J. LEGAL. ETMICs 393, 394 (1991).
72. Id. at 395.




trained in the British tradition, if not in Britain, the old-world sense
of ethics and its laissez-faire attitude toward business development
took hold in America.74 The first American legal code of ethics in
1887 specifically forbade solicitation. 7  The ABA's Canons of
Professional Ethics in 1908 referred to solicitation by circular or
other written advertisement or by personal communications as simply
"unprofessional.' '76 Even if solitication was discouraged in other
licensed professions in the past, the trend in today's courts is to
allow this type of commercial speech. Financial advisors, 77 dentists,7 8
pharmacists, 79 attorneys,80 and now, after Edenfield, accountants"'
have all received favorable decisions with regard to advertising and,
in some cases, direct solicitation.
Nevertheless, the OhralikP2 decision, cited repeatedly in Edenfield,
stands alone in this line of cases. Ohralik, an attorney in Ohio, was
suspended from the Ohio bar as a result of his actions in attempting
to represent two car accident victims.83 Ohralik visited one victim
in the hospital" and visited another at home after her discharge
from the hospital.8 5 He recorded representation agreements using a
concealed tape recorder8 6 and continued his representation after one
74. Id. at 395-96. "Let business seek the young attorney." Id. at 397 n.36
(quoting G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, 55, 131 (Philadelphia,
5th ed. 1897).
75. Id. at 397. Alabama was the first state to enact a code of ethics for lawyers.
Id.
76. Id. at 398.
77. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985) (holding that even an unregistered
financial advisor can publish an investment newsletter not targeted to individual
clients).
78. See Ardt v. Department of Professional Regulation, 607 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill.
1993) (overturning a ban on the term "family dentistry" in dental advertisements).
79. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976); see supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
80. With the exception of direct, face-to-face solicitation prohibited by Ohralik,
a host of recent cases have upheld an attorney's free speech right to solicit clients
in almost every other conceivable way. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(allowing the advertisement of routine legal services); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191
(1982) (allowing advertising of legal services not specifically prohibited by state
ethical rules); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct., 471 U.S.
626 (1985) (allowing advertisement including an actual drawing of an IUD); Shapero
v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (allowing targeted direct-mail ad-
vertising).
81. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
82. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
83. Id. at 453-54.
84. Id. at 450.
85. Id. at 451.
86. Id. at 450-51.
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of the victims discharged him as her attorney.87 Both victims filed
complaints,"8 and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio found that Ohralik had
violated disciplinary rules 2-103 (A) and 2-104 (A) of the Ohio Code
of Professional Responsibility.8 9 Ohralik's defense included a
commercial speech argument that was rejected at each court level,
including the U.S. Supreme Court. 90 The express purpose of the
Ohralik holding, according to the Court, was to answer, at least
partially, a question reserved from Batesl: What should be the scope
of regulation of in-person solicitation of clients by lawyers? 92 Ohralik
holds that a state may constitutionally use a prophylactic rule
forbidding solicitation and, if needed, "discipline a lawyer for soliciting
clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to
pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent." 93
However, Ohralik left several questions unanswered. The most
obvious one was in what "circumstances" and in order to forestall
which "dangers" would constitutional lines be drawn to allow the
control of solicitation without offending commercial speech
protections. Because the overreaching of Ohralik was so extreme,9
the question of Ohralik's limited precedential value was raised by
Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion. 95 In his concurrence,
Justice Marshall compared Ohralik with In re Primus,9 a companion
case handed down the same day. Primus involved solicitation by an
attorney working for the American Civil Liberties Union who offered
free legal services to a Medicaid patient who had been sterilized. 97
The Court found Primus's speech was protected by the First
Amendment, since it involved both political expression and the
absence of remuneration for the attorney. 98 Marshall viewed the fact
8-7. Ird at 4521Qv T ... A C
88. Id.
89. Id. at 452-53. These Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility utilize language very similar to Rule 7.3 of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct to forbid attorney solicitation. See supra note 5.
90. 436 U.S. at 452-54. The Court noted, "A lawyer's procurement of re-
munerative employment is a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment
concerns. It falls within the State's proper sphere of economic and professional
regulation." Id. at 459.
91. Id. at 449. See supra text accompanying note 17.
92. 436 U.S. at 448-49.
93. Id. at 449, 467.
94. Id. at 468.
95. Id. at 469-70 (Marshall, J., concurring).
96. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
97. Id. at 415.
98. Id. at 431.
[Vol. 16:683
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
situations of these two cases as polar opposites on the constitutional
spectrum and attempted to offer guidance for the numerous
intermediate fact situations that would fall in between. 99 The
intermediate situation most problematic to Marshall was what he
termed "benign" solicitation of clients by attorneys.'10 Justice Marshall
would have limited the state's interests to only the substantive evils
inherent in solicitation such as "actual fraud, overreaching, deception,
and misrepresentation.''0 To date, the Court has not refined its
stance on attorney solicitation as Marshall suggested in Ohralik.
Solicitation by accountants had received little judicial attention
before Edenfield. The rules of ethics for accountants, like those for
attorneys, ban only solicitation that is false, misleading, deceptive
or accompanied by coercion, overreaching, or harassing conduct. 0 2
Other than Florida's law, implicated in Edenfield, only three states
at the time of the decision had banned CPA solicitation by statute. 03
Although Louisiana's law withstood antitrust challenge from the
United States in 1987,'04 Edenfield represented the first time such
a law was subjected to First Amendment constitutional challenge
before the Supreme Court. 0 5
99. Id. at 471-73 (Justice Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall advocated adherence
to the Bates standard for such intermediate situations. Id. at 472. In Bates, truthful
print advertising of routine legal services was deemed constitutionally protected
commercial speech. Id.
100. Id. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall explained:
By "benign" commercial solicitation, I mean solicitation by advice and
information that is truthful and that is presented in a noncoercive, non-
deceitful, and dignified manner to a potential client who is emotionally
and physically capable of making a rational decision either to accept or
reject the representation with respect to a legal claim or matter that is
not frivolous.
Id.
101. Id. at 472-73 (Marshall, J., concurring).
102. AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAu. CONDUCT Rule 502 (1988).
103. 113 S. Ct. at 1800. According to the Supreme Court opinion, the three
states were Louisiana (LA. ADMN. CODE tit. 46, section XIX.507(D)(l)(c) (Supp.
1988)), Minnesota (MINN. R. 110.6100 (1991), and Texas (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit.
22, section 501.44 (Supp. 1992)). 113 S. Ct. at 1800. Interestingly, the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion in Edenfield, omits Minnesota and cites Georgia (GA. CODE ANN.
section 43-3-35(i) (Michie 1988)) instead. Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1516
n.2 (lth Cir. 1991). The reason for the discrepancy is not clear.
104. United States v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, No. Civ. A. 83-
1947, 1987 WL 7905, at *1 (E.D. La. March 11, 1987). This case is cited only in
the Eleventh Circuit Edenfield decision, not the Supreme Court opinion. The
Louisiana district court held in favor of the state. Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d
1514, 1516 n.4 (11th Cir. 1991).
105. 113 S. Ct. at 1796.
19941
UALR LAW JOURNAL
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
Throughout the opinion, the Edenfield Court rested its reasoning
on a narrowing of the Ohralik holding. 0 6 Writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy noted at the outset that not all personal solicitation
is harmful and devoid of First Amendment protection, and Ohralik
should not be read to suggest such a notion."° In fact, within a
commercial setting, solicitation can be of great value to both buyer
and seller, especially when the product being solicited is, like ac-
counting services, something nonstandard. 08 Speech that does no
more than propose a commercial transaction is deserving of First
Amendment protection, the Court announced. 0 9
Nevertheless, the Court added that a state is left with some
power to regulate, since the commercial speech is "linked inextri-
cably" to the commercial arrangement it proposes." 0 By comparing
the competing interests of society and the state in commercial speech,
the Court laid the groundwork in Part II of the opinion for the
intermediate scrutiny analysis, as set forth in Central Hudson and
modified by Fox, to be applied in Part III."' The Court even cited
the phrase "tailored in a reasonable manner" to describe the less
strict nexus required from Fox.1
12
The Court then proceeded through the four-part Central Hudson
test." 3 First, the Court disposed of the first prong of the test by
noting that there was little doubt that any solicitation by Fane would
have been both truthful and lawful." 4 Second, the Court determined
that the state interests seeking protection under the anti-solicitation
rule were indeed substantial." 5 Third, the court was required to find
106. Id. at 1802. The Court distanced itself from Ohralik at several points in
the opinion. "While we did uphold a ban on in-person solicitation by lawyers in
Ohralik ... that opinion does not hold that all personal solicitation is without
First Amendment protection." Id. at 1797 (emphasis added). "Ohralik's holding
was narrow .... " Id. at 1802 (emphasis added). "Were we to read Ohralik in
the manner the Board proposes, the protection afforded commercial speech would
be reduced almost to nothing .. " Id. at 1803 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 1797-98.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1798.




114. Id. at 1798-1800. The Court, of necessity, engaged in a hypothetical at this
stage of the test. Fane had not solicited in fact; he only sought a declaratory
judgment. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
115. 113 S. Ct. at 1800-01. The Board of Accountancy proffered two overriding
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that the rule in question advanced the state interests in a direct and
material way." 6 At this third prong of the analysis, the Florida CPA
anti-solicitation law ran afoul of the Central Hudson test."
7
The penultimate prong of the test requires that a regulation
restricting commercial speech "directly advance the state interest
involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose."" 8 By
quoting this language directly from Central Hudson, the Court
underscored the precise point at which the Florida law failed. The
Edenfield Court reiterated that the burden of proving this direct
and material relationship between means and ends falls upon the
State." 9 According to the Court, not only did Florida fail to show
a direct relationship, it failed to show any relationship,120 The Court
criticized the absence of any studies, anecdotal evidence, or even
conduct on Fane's part to support the state's contention that CPA
solicitation creates harm.' 2 ' The State's alternative time, place, and
manner argument was dismissed for the same reason.
22
The Court further distinguished Ohralik by focusing on the
professional differences between CPAs and attorneys. 23 The Court
held that "Ohralik does not stand for the proposition that blanket
bans on personal solicitation by all types of professionals are con-
stitutional in all circumstances.'" 24 Quoting Virginia Pharmacy, the
interests: (1) protecting consumers from unscrupulous CPAs and (2) maintaining
the necessary independence of CPAs to perform the audit and attest functions.
The first interest included the lesser interests of protection against fraud as well
as protection of privacy. Id. at 1799-1800.
116. Id. at 1800-01.
117. Id. The Court never reached the fourth prong analysis as it did in Discovery
Network. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69. The distinction between the
third prong (speech restriction directly and materially advancing the state interest)
and the fourth prong (reasonable fit between speech restriction and state interest)
is subtle. See 113 S. Ct. at 1798. Nevertheless, the Court found a distinction
between the Florida solicitation law and the Cincinnati newsrack law as applied
to First Amendment analysis. Had the Board of Accountancy been able to prove
a direct and material connection to the state interests, it is debatable whether the
Florida law would have survived the reasonableness test of the fourth prong.
118. 113 S. Ct. at 1800 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564).
119. Id. at 1800 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71
n.20 (1983)).
120. Id. at 1800-01.
121. Id. at 1800. The Court expressed incredulity that such evidence was lacking
even though 21 states have no restriction of any kind on CPA solicitation. Id.
122. Id. at 1801-02.
123. Id. at 1802-03.
124. Id. at 1802.
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Court added, "the distinctions, historical and functional, between
professions, may require consideration of quite different factors. ' 25
The Court also looked to differences between the clients of these
professions and specifically noted the danger of "uninformed ac-
quiescence," a term taken from Ohralik.1' Uninformed acquiescence
refers to the relatively high state of vulnerability under which a
lawyer, but not a CPA, would likely find a potential client. 127 The
Edenfield Court envisioned markedly different circumstances sur-
rounding the solicitation of CPA clients as compared to the solic-
itation of attorney clients and concluded that the former posed none
of the dangers of the latter.'2
The Court concluded with a primer on prophylactic rules and
their correct application in commercial speech cases. 29 Although
Ohralik allowed the existence of a prophylactic rule in the case of
attorney solicitation, Ohralik did not relieve the state of its obligation
to create rules that must have a direct effect on its stated objectives. 30
Broad prophylactic rules applied to commercial speech are suspect,
the Court held; consequently, "[p]recision of regulation must be the
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious free-
doms.""'3
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor failed to see the professional
distinction between CPAs and lawyers. 3 2 For purposes of consti-
tutional analysis, she observed that CPAs and lawyers are very similar
in the sense that they both solicit from positions of power derived
from professional expertise, not from over-developed persuasive
skills. 133 O'Connor went on to say that continued commercialization
of the learned professions through increased advertising will have
detrimental effects on professional culture. 34 Finally, Justice O'Con-
nor stated that the majority never truly applied the Central Hudson
125. Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976)).
126. Id. at 1802-03 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447,
465-66 (1978)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1802-03. The Court went into great detail to describe the typical
sophisticated client of a CPA as compared to the often confused and vulnerable
client of a lawyer and concluded that it was not unreasonable for a state to presume
that lawyer solicitation will more often than not be injurious to a potential client.
Id. (quoting 436 U.S. at 465-66).
129. Id. at 1803.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1803-04 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
132. Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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test to the Florida antisolicitation law. 3' If it had, she argued, it
would have discovered that the law could pass constitutional muster
and would have upheld the law as originally legislated.
3 6
V. SIGNIFICANCE
After Edenfield, it seems clear that in-person solicitation by an
accountant is protected under the commercial speech doctrine of the
First Amendment. 37 Beyond that, many questions remain. One ques-
tion still left unanswered after Edenfield and Ohralik is whether
lawyer solicitation in a business context, with sophisticated clients,
under circumstances not likely to pose the dangers so vividly high-
lighted in Ohralik, might be constitutionally protected commercial
speech. As the hypothetical 38 introducing this note asked, if an
accountant unwittingly explains his legal problem to an attorney in
casual conversation, and the attorney offers his business card in
return, has anything unethical or unlawful taken place? Such a
scenario may illustrate the "benign" solicitation that the late Justice
Marshall contemplated in his concurring opinion in Ohralik.139 Mar-
shall's term did not appear in Edenfield, but Edenfield's unques-
tionably narrow interpretation of the Ohralik holding may have, in
effect, created a wider constitutional gulf between the two cases into
which benign solicitation by attorneys may now fit.14° Some observers
see Edenfield as opening the door for attorney solicitation. 141 On
its face, however, Edenfield does very little to resolve the tension
that still exists between Ohralik and Rule 7.3 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. 42
The significance of Edenfield must also be measured in terms
of its stabilizing effect on the Central Hudson test. Edenfield should
reassure those who feared that the Central Hudson test had devolved
from intermediate to mere rational scrutiny in the wake of the
135. Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1806 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1796.
138. See supra note 5.
139. 436 U.S. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring).
140. See supra note 106.
141. James Podgers, Image Problem, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 66, 70-72. Florida
Bar President Patricia A. Seitz predicts solicitation will now be allowed where the
client is not in an "emotional state." Id. at 72. This seems to comport with the
basic rule of Ohralik. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 5. The tension results from the fact that because Ohralik's
facts fit so squarely into Rule 7.3's prohibition, the case is of virtually no help
in defining the margins of the Rule. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
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Posadas and Fox holdings. 43 Although Fox dilates the fourth prong
somewhat,'4 the Central Hudson test has survived essentially intact.
In addition, it is now clear that parties seeking to restrict commercial
speech bear the burden of proving the necessity of their restriction. 1
45
Interestingly, the opinions in both Edenfield'46 and Discovery Net-
work, Inc. 47 imply that the laws at issue in each case were not
unconstitutional per se; rather, the governmental entities seeking the
speech restriction simply did not make their case. Had the state of
Florida and the city of Cincinnati been able to gather more evidence
to connect their laws to their substantial interests, the outcomes of
both cases might have been different. Viewed in this light, Edenfield
and Discovery Network, Inc. may tell us more about poor lawyering
than they do about the limits of the commercial speech doctrine.
Finally, Edenfield is significant because it raises a fundamental
question about how we, as a society, view certain professions and
their function within the marketplace. At the simplest level, the
Edenfield decision holds that accountants may solicit because they
are not lawyers. 4 The Ohralik decision holds that lawyers may not
solicit precisely because they are lawyers. 49 Thus, the Court in both
cases adopted a functional approach to resolve the commercial speech
question at issue; that is, the Court looked to the professional
distinctions between accountants, attorneys, and other vocations as
143. 113 S. Ct. at 1798. Contra Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Commercial Speech after
Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66
TUL. L. REv. 1931, 1931-33 (1992) (suggesting a shift toward a more lenient rational
scrutiny standard in commercial speech cases).
144. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
145. 113 S. Ct. at 1800. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983)).
146. Id. at 1800. The Court said, "The Board has not demonstrated that
the ban on CPA solicitation advances its asserted interests in any direct and material
way. It presents no studies ... [t]he record does not disclose any anecdotal evidence
... [n]ot even Fane's own conduct suggests that the Board's concerns are justified."
Id.
147. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1516 (1983). The
Court held, "Our holding, however, is narrow ... we do not reach the question
whether, given certain facts and under certain circumstances, a community might
be able to justify differential treatment of commercial and noncommercial newsracks.
We simply hold that on this record Cincinnati has failed to make such a showing."
Id.
148. 113 S. Ct. at 1802. Said the Edenfield Court, "The solicitation here poses
none of the same dangers. Unlike a lawyer, a CPA is not 'a professional trained
in the art of persuasion.' " Id. (emphasis added).
149. 436 U.S. at 464-65. The Ohralik Court stressed, "It hardly need be said
that the potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a lawyer, a pro-
fessional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated,
injured, or distressed lay person." Id.
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a basis for its holding. In contrast, most commercial speech cases
leading up to Edenfield focused on the intended information to be
transferred by the questionable speech, not the speaker. 50 Justice
Marshall's concurrence in Ohralik is a good example of this infor-
mational approach.' In a sense, the functional approach reflects
our traditional view of licensed professions as a calling rather than
a job, and concomitant with the calling a higher standard of com-
mercial ethics is assumed. 52 Edenfield, seen through this functional
model, represents at one level a regression to the pre-Bates'" attitude
toward commercial speech, where lawyers are a unique profession
commanding discrete judicial treatment. At another level, Edenfield
can be interpreted as a harbinger of the end of such discrete treat-
ment, at least as it relates to solicitation. The Edenfield majority
devoted much of its attention to limiting Ohralik to its facts.'5 4 This
treatment of the Ohralik holding may well have narrowed it out of
significance for future commercial speech cases, especially those
relating to attorneys. This application of the functional model would
still impose somewhat different judicial treatment to lawyers as a
professional group, but it would recognize the Ohralik holding as
an anomoly due to its extreme fact situation.'55
Legal advertising, including solicitation and other marketing
forms, has generated renewed discussion within the organized bar.
A recent ABA Journal-Gallup Poll revealed that 87% of attorneys
said advertising had a negative effect on the image of their pro-
fession. 56 The same poll indicated that 61% worked in firms that
advertise, and 79% of the partners polled planned to continue
advertising.' 57 The notion that lawyers, accountants, or any of the
150. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct., 471 U.S. 626
(1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978);
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
151. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. Marshall argued:
"Like rules against advertising, rules against solicitation substantially im-
pede the flow of important information to consumers .... The First
Amendment informational interests served by solicitation, whether or not
it occurs in a purely commercial context, are substantial and they are
entitled to as much protection as the interests we found to be protected
in Bates."
436 U.S. at 473-74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
152. See Hill, supra note 71.
153. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates holds that truthful advertising
of routine legal services cannot be prohibited by the State. Id. at 383.
154. 113 S. Ct. at 1796-1804. The Edenfield Court cited Ohralik no less than
25 times, most of which were for purposes of contrast. Id.
155. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
156. Podgers, supra note 141, at 72.
157. Podgers, supra note 141, at 73.
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licensed professions are in some way "above trade" appears to be
a thing of the past. 58 Economic forces will likely force many profes-
sions into more aggressive means to transmit information about their
services. 59 If the Court follows the societal trend, Edenfield may
mark the beginning of the end for prohibitions on business solici-
tation.
L. Kyle Heffley
158. Podgers, supra note 141, at 70.
159. Podgers, supra note 141, at 70.
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